I think this strategy will be most effective when combined with targeted advocacy, that is, after a given community is convinced that they want to help and want to know how they can best help.Īpproach three: Fast, stable, reachable Tor clients auto-promote themselves.
For example, we could provide a customized bridge-by-default bundle for a Chinese human rights NGO that publishes your bridge address directly to them then they give out the bridge addresses from their volunteers through their own social network. People who want to help out can now simply download and run our bridge-by-default bundle, and poof they're a bridge. Nobody knows that they should click it or why.Īpproach two: Bridge-by-default bundles. But lots here is thousands, not hundreds of thousands. Easy to do, and lots of people have done it.
This approach was our first try at getting more bridges: click on "Sharing", then "Help censored users reach the Tor network". How can we get them? Here are five strategies.Īpproach one: Make it easy to become a bridge using the Vidalia interface. But even if we come up with brilliant new distribution mechanisms, we simply need more addresses to work with. The distribution strategy that works best right now is ad hoc distribution via social connections. One piece of the puzzle is smarter bridge distribution mechanisms (plus see this post for more thoughts) - right now we're getting 8000 mails a day from gmail asking for bridges from a pool of less than a thousand. But since then, China has learned and blocked most of the bridges we give out through public (https and gmail) distribution channels. We deployed them several years ago in anticipation of the upcoming arms race, and they worked great in their first showing in 2009. So even if an attacker blocks all the public relays, they still need to block all these "private" or "dark" relays too. In retrospect, the correct statement was: "We need the rate of new bridge addresses to exceed the rate that the adversary can block them."įor background, bridge relays (aka bridges) are Tor relays that aren't listed in the main Tor directory. When I first envisioned the bridge address arms race, I said "We need to get lots of bridges, so the adversary can't learn them all." That was the wrong statement to make.
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